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Abstract
Experimental tests of choice predictions in one-shot games show
only little support for Nash equilibrium (NE). Poisson Cognitive Hier-
archy (PCH) and level-k (LK) are behavioral models of the thinking-
steps variety where subjects differ in the number of levels of iterated
reasoning they perform. Camerer et al. (2004) claim that substituting
the Poisson parameter τ = 1.5 yields a parameter-free PCH model
(pfPCH) which predicts experimental data considerably better than
NE. We design a new multi-person game, the Minimizer Game, as a
testbed to compare initial choice predictions of NE, pfPCH and LK.
Data obtained from two large-scale online experiments strongly reject
NE and LK, but are well in line with the point-prediction of pfPCH.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Nash equilibrium in one-shot games
Nash equilibrium (NE) is the central solution concept in noncooperative game
theory, but it is well known that NE imposes extremely demanding assump-
tions on players’ rationality as well as on the consistency of their beliefs
(Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995). Experimental tests of game theoretic
strategy choice predictions in one-shot games, where players are inexperi-
enced and have no possibility of learning, have consistently shown only little
support for NE except in rather specific games (Camerer, 2003). Game the-
orists have therefore worked out a variety of alternative explanations and
models for prediction of choices in one-shot games. One such approach is to
keep the rationality assumption and weaken the mutual consistency require-
ments. Any concept following this approach must address the question of
how players form their beliefs about other players’ actions. This has led to
the formulation of so-called thinking steps models.
1.2 Level-k models
The basic assumption of the thinking steps approach is that players differ
in the number of steps of iterated reasoning they apply when deliberating
which strategy they should pick in a strategic choice problem. Nagel (1995)
used a simple thinking steps model to explain the results of her experiments
about number choices in the p-beauty-contest game (or p-guessing game),
where players choose a number from [0, 100] and whoever comes closest to
p times the average of the chosen numbers wins a fixed prize. Her model
explains the “spikes” around choices of 33 and 22, which are often observed
in experimental data for the typical parameter p = 2/3. Similar thinking
steps models have been proposed by Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) and by
Ho et al. (1998).
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The most prominent model of the thinking steps variety is the level-k
model (LK model) introduced by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001). It proposes
that most players can be classified as level-k (lk) types, which anchor their
beliefs in an l0 type who does not think strategically at all but just chooses
from a uniform random distribution on the set of pure strategies.1 lk then
simply best responds (possibly with noise) to l(k − 1). These lk types are
complemented by types dk, who best respond to a uniform distribution of
beliefs on strategies surviving k rounds of iterated dominance, respectively.
Finally, some players might be equilibrium types, choosing an equilibrium
strategy, or sophisticated, best responding to an accurate distribution of be-
liefs on other types. LK models have been applied in econometric analyses of
various experimental data by Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), Crawford
and Iriberri (2007a, 2007b), and Costa-Gomes et al. (2009), among others.
These studies spawned a large body of literature (see the recent review by
Crawford et al., 2013). By and large, the common view that emerged from
this literature is that l1 and l2 types are predominant in subject populations,
complemented by smaller fractions of l3 and possibly l4, d1 and equilibrium
types. l0 as well as l5 or higher, d2 or higher, and sophisticated types,
however, are virtually absent from the population.
1.3 The Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy model
A closely related thinking steps model is the Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy
model (PCH model) of Camerer et al. (2004). This model uses only a single
parameter, τ . It is based on the view that players differ in their level k of iter-
ated thinking, and that k is distributed in the population of players following
1A vast majority of applications uses this specification of l0 behavior. Alternatively
l0 has also been suggested to choose the most salient strategy in games with non-neutral
frames (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007b), but this approach is not without problems itself
(Hargreaves Heap et al., 2014). Burchardi and Penczynski (2014) use an innovative exper-
imental design to identify l0 reasoning in beauty-contest games. For a recent systematic
approach to l0 behavior see Wright and Leyton-Brown (2014a).
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a Poisson distribution with mean (and therefore variance) τ . Moreover, while
a level-k (Lk) player thinks that all other players do less steps of reasoning
than he himself, he is aware of the presence of all levels of reasoning from 0
to k − 1 in the population. The frequency he believes these lower levels to
occur are the true (Poisson) frequencies, truncated at k − 1 and normalized
so as to add up to 1.
The PCH model has been shown to predict reasonably well in a variety
of games, among them p-beauty-contest games with p < 12, market entry
games, 3× 3 bimatrix games (Camerer et al., 2004), coordination games
(Costa-Gomes et al., 2009), and the action commitment game (Carvalho and
Santos-Pinto, 2014). While, as expected, the best-fitting value of τ is game-
and population-specific, Camerer et al. (2004) report that a value of τ = 1.5,
corresponding to a population dominated by L1 and L2 types, is able to
explain experimental data considerably better than Nash equilibrium across
a variety of experimental games.
While the PCH model is simple to apply and has proven useful in a num-
ber of games, it also seems to fail in some specific classes of games. For
example, it is well known that in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Public Goods
experiments initial cooperation levels are substantial (see Camerer, 2003).
Under the assumption of self-regarding preferences such behavior cannot be
explained by a PCH model, since there all types but L0 optimize and hence
never choose dominated strategies. For the same reason, PCH cannot account
for the puzzling majority choices of dominated strategies in the two-person
beauty contest of Grosskopf and Nagel (2008). As Camerer et al. (2004) re-
port, the PCH model also predicts almost random choice in p-beauty-contest
games with p > 1. Another problem arises in games with large strategy
spaces. Camerer et al. (2002) mention that in such games PCH predicts
only a small fraction of the strategies actually chosen. An example for this
2There is, however, some discussion about how well the PCH model really predicts in
these games, see e.g. Hahn et al. (2010) or chapter 17.3 of Moffatt (2015).
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is found in Gneezy (2005), where prior to grouping the data PCH cannot
account for bid choices in a first-price auction with 100 pure strategies.
Camerer et al. (2002) devote section 4.1 of their working paper to inves-
tigate what went wrong in games 2, 6, and 8 of the 12 games of Stahl and
Wilson (1995). These are symmetric 3×3-games where the best-fitting PCH
model is τ = 0, predicting purely random choice. But actually roughly half
of the subjects picked their Nash equilibrium strategy in these three games.
Camerer et al. (2002) speculate that the experimental procedure of Stahl
and Wilson may have catalyzed a large fraction of Nash play. However, a
more parsimonious explanation derives from the observation that in these
three games the Nash equilibrium strategy also happened to be the unique
maximin choice. Maximin choices actually predict the majority choices in
ten out of the 12 Stahl-Wilson games. In games where strategic thinking
is cognitively demanding, the nonstrategic and risk-averse maximin choice
is an easy option and might often be a more salient anchor than uniform
randomization for level-0 types (see also Van Huyck et al., 1991).
1.4 Predicting choice with the parameter-free Poisson
Cognitive Hierarchy model
As noted by Wright and Leyton-Brown (2014b), the bulk of the literature on
thinking steps models is concerned more with explaining than with predicting
behavior. Typically, type distributions and other parameters are estimated
from experimental training data while direct prediction performance com-
parisons are rare. In this paper we focus on prediction in a very strict sense.
What we aim at is the prediction of initial choices without any prior pa-
rameter estimation. For this we need a parameter-free model which can be
directly pitted against Nash equilibrium.
To our knowledge, within the thinking steps variety the only parameter-
free model to be found in the literature is the PCH model which results from
substituting τ = 1.5 for the Poisson parameter, suggested by Camerer et
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al. (2004). In their Abstract they state that [a]n average of 1.5 steps fits
data from many games (p. 861); they note that values of τ between 1 and
2 explain empirical results for nearly 100 games, suggesting that assuming a
τ value of 1.5 could give reliable predictions for many other games as well
(p. 863) and that the data suggest that the Poisson-CH model with τ = 1.5
can be used to reliably predict behaviors in new games (p. 877). In their
conclusion, Camerer et al. (2004) stress that [t]he value τ = 1.5 is a good
omnibus guess which makes the Poisson-CH theory parameter-free and is
very likely to predict as accurately as Nash equilibrium, or more accurately,
in one-shot games (p. 890).
We call the PCH model with τ = 1.5 the parameter-free PCH model (pf-
PCH model). The pfPCH model states that the population wide frequencies
of levels L0, L1, L2, and L3 are given by 22.3%, 33.5%, 25.1%, and 12.6%,
respectively, with only 6.6% accruing from levels 4 and higher. The value
τ = 1.5 for the mean (and the variance) of the number of thinking-steps
is based on experimental data from various games scrutinized by Camerer
et al. (2004). Does this value also predict reasonably out of sample, i.e. in
games beyond the classes of games it was derived from? To evaluate the pre-
dictive performance of the pfPCH model we use it to predict the distribution
of initial choices in a new game, the minimizer game described below, which
we motivate and construct specifically for this purpose.
We do not only compare the pfPCH-prediction to the Nash-prediction,
but also to the LK model’s prediction. The LK model is not parameter-
free and we are not aware of any suggestions for a “good omnibus guess”
of LK type frequencies from the literature. We therefore take a generous
approach and allow for all type distributions of the LK model. We find that
in our minimizer game the pfPCH-prediction easily outperforms both Nash
equilibrium and all LK model specifications.
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2 The Minimizer Game
How well does the pfPCH model predict players’ initial response to a strate-
gic choice problem? We planned to answer this question experimentally and
started by asking what kind of game would be appropriate for an experimen-
tal test of this question. In our opinion, three issues had to be considered:
• Experimental outcomes in Prisoner’s Dilemma games, Public Goods
games, Dictator games, Ultimatum games and the like are strongly in-
fluenced by the presence of altruistic motives, fairness considerations,
or other social preferences. These preferences “contaminate” the ex-
perimental results, since they may override the strategic incentives cre-
ated by the monetary payoffs.3 We should therefore avoid games where
choices are sensitive to the presence of social preferences. This basically
rules out almost all two-player games. It seems therefore wise to look
for a multi-person game where other-regarding preferences are unlikely
to influence choices.
• Since the premise of the thinking steps models is that given their be-
liefs, players optimize, we should choose a simple game for our test.
If due to computational complexity subjects get the arithmetic wrong
when optimizing, choices will be biased even if the PCH model accu-
rately describes belief formation and the distribution of thinking steps.
It is to a large extent a matter of taste what kind of game to deem sim-
ple. However, bearing in mind Grosskopf and Nagel’s (2008) stunning
results for two-person beauty contest games, where even a majority of
professionals failed to realize that 0 is a dominant strategy, we would
strongly opt for avoidance of the need of any arithmetic having to be
done by subjects trying to optimize. Moreover, simplicity seems to
3Wright and Leyton-Brown (2014a) find that the feature of fairness of an action is
especially prone to influence level-0 behavior.
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require a rather small set of possible choices, since with a larger num-
ber of choices both formation of beliefs and optimization given beliefs
become computationally demanding.
• A third aspect to be aware of are attitudes towards risk. Strategic
uncertainty may lead subjects with different risk attitudes to different
choices, which could then falsely be attributed to different levels of
iterated reasoning. As discussed above, nonstrategic and strongly risk-
averse subjects might tend to choose their maximin strategy in the
face of strategic uncertainty, again biasing the distribution of think-
ing steps. Ideally we would therefore construct an experimental game
where maximin does not restrict the set of available choices.
2.1 Definition of the minimizer game
Considering these three points we specifically designed a game for our ex-
periments which to the best of our knowledge has not been studied before.
For reasons which will become clear in a moment, we call this game the
minimizer game (MG). The formal definition of an MG is the following.
Let P = {1, . . . , I} be a finite set of players, let N be a finite subset of N,
and let n = |N | be the size of N . Players’ strategy sets are Si = N for all i,
so each player chooses a number from the set N . For a pure strategy profile
s = (si)i∈I and for k ∈ N let ck(s) = |{i ∈ P : si = k}| count the number of
players choosing k in the profile s. LetM(s) = argmink∈N{ck(s) : ck(s) ≥ 1}
be the set containing the numbers which have been chosen least often among
those chosen at all in profile s. Let m(s) = minM(s) be the smallest of these
numbers. The payoff function is identical for all players and is given by
ui(s) = m(s) c
−1
m(s)(s) if si = m(s) and ui(s) = 0 else.
Despite its technically sounding definition, it is easy to explain the MG
in an extremely simple and intuitive way. The rules of the game state that
each subject may choose its desired payoff from a given set of possible integer
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payoffs. The ‘winning amount’ is the amount chosen least often in total -
the minimizer. Among all players who chose the minimizer, one player is
randomly drawn to receive this amount, while all others receive zero.4 Ties
are broken by declaring the smallest of the least often chosen amounts to be
the minimizer.
While this is neither necessary nor specified in the definition, when it
comes to experiments we implicitly think of the MG as being played with a
small number of possible choices and a large number of players. The reasons
for this are explained in the section on equilibrium analysis of the MG.
2.2 Advantages of the MG
The MG appears markedly dissimilar from strategic choice situations which
are frequently encountered in everyday life. It may thus be considered artifi-
cial, but we consider this an explicit advantage. The reason is that we focus
on choices in truly one-shot games, and for this we have to make it unlikely
that subjects can transfer experiences from related games they “played” in
the past. We think that this is the case for the MG. While the MG has
many features of a congestion game,5 its peculiar rules make it very unlike
the “typical” congestion games people unconsciously play, like e.g. choosing
the fastest road to their office in the morning.
Let us now reconsider our list of three points.
4An even simpler, deterministic variant of the MG lets all players having chosen the
minimizer receive this amount, i.e. ui(s) = m(s) if si = m(s) and ui(s) = 0 else. While
this variant was the first we came up with, it is technically almost infeasible in our large-
population online experimental approach, which is why we proceeded to work with the
stochastic variant of the MG described here.
5The MG should not be confused with the superficially similar minority game, which
builds upon the El Farol bar problem (Arthur, 1994) and has been studied intensively in
the statistical physics literature. It is related, but not identical to the LUPI Lottery game
(O¨stling et al., 2011) either. Note that in the LUPI game, contrary to the MG, the prize
for the winner is independent of the winning number. Moreover, if there is no uniquely
chosen number, then all payoffs are zero in the LUPI game. Thus, the LUPI game is
interesting if there are many more available choices than players, while we study the MG
in the exactly opposite case.
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• Social preferences do not interfere in the MG, at least if the number
of players I is large. Since the influence of one’s own choice on the
overall minimizer is typically negligible, there is no obvious way social
preferences, even if present, could influence choice behavior.
• When it comes to optimizing, the MG is extremely simple. Given
a belief about the individual distribution of number choices of other
players, maximization of expected payoff is straightforward if I is large:
Choose the number which has the lowest frequency. As opposed to
beauty contest games, bimatrix games, or first-price auction games,
this does not require subjects to perform any arithmetical operations.
• In the MG, any choice might result in a zero payoff in the worst case.
Therefore maximin has no bite in this game.
Taken together, these advantages indicate that the MG (with large I and
small n) is well suited to test the pfPCH model in a “purified” context, i.e. in
a context where confounders are eliminated as far as possible. Note, however,
that we do not bias our test in favor of pfPCH. In principle, eliminating the
three confounders could work for or against the pfPCH-prediction.
2.3 Nash equilibria of the MG
Consider an MG with n ≥ 2 and let s be a pure-strategy profile with ck(s) ≥ 2
for all k and |M(s)| ≥ 2. By the tie-breaking rule, the smallest element of
M(s) is the minimizer and only the players having chosen this minimizer
get a nonzero expected payoff. But no player has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally, because switching to the minimizer causes this amount to lose
its minimizer status and leads to a zero payoff. Hence s is a Nash equilib-
rium. The MG has a variety of such asymmetric equilibria. However, all
these asymmetric equilibria, requiring explicit coordination in a symmetric
one-shot setting, are implausible solutions. Classical game theoretic choice
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prediction would instead point to a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the MG.
Such an equilibrium always exists, since the game is symmetric and finite.
The MG can not be solved analytically and the simplifying approach of
modeling the MG as a Poisson game (Myerson, 1998, 2000) does not work.6
However, for our purposes we do not need to explicitly calculate an equi-
librium. Indeed, every symmetric equilibrium of the MG approaches the
uniform distribution on the set N of available choices as the number I of
players grows to infinity, and the same is true for the aggregate distribution
of choices in any non-pure equilibrium.7 Since we have a large number of par-
ticipants in our experiments, we can safely approximate the symmetric equi-
librium by the uniform distribution. As an example, if N = {100, 150, 200},
as in our basic experimental treatment, then the equilibrium distribution is
E ≈ (0.320, 0.329, 0.351) for I = 300 players. Whenever the subject pool is
sufficiently large, the distribution of choice frequencies as predicted by the
Nash hypothesis will be close to uniform.
2.4 PCH-predictions for the MG
What choice frequencies (p1, p2, p3) does the PCH model predict in the MG
with N = {1, 2, 3} in a large population? The answer depends on the exact
values of τ and I, but for large I the prediction is that p1 < p2 < p3 holds
uniformly for 0 < τ < τ¯ , where τ¯ ≈ 1.8. To see this, note that the nonstrate-
gic L0 types choose each number with probability 1/3 by assumption. Hence
L1 types believe that choices are distributed uniformly and maximize their
6The latter route proved successful for LUPI games (O¨stling et al., 2011) and lowest
unique bid auctions (Pigolotti et al., 2012), but the uniqueness of winning choices in
these games, which the MG lacks, is crucial for the Poisson games approach to generate a
tractable solution.
7Let e be in the ω-limit of the sets of symmetric equilibria for I →∞. Assume e is not
uniform. Then there are integers kˆ and kˇ such that ekˆ > ekˇ are the maximal and minimal
frequencies, respectively. But then by the law of large numbers we can make it arbitrarily
more likely for kˇ to be the minimizer than kˆ by choosing the number I of players large
enough. This contradicts equality of expected payoffs in mixed equilibria.
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payoff by picking the highest number, 3. L2 types believe that all others are
L0 or L1, hence in their opinion 3 will be chosen most often and 1 and 2
have equal chances of turning out as minimizers. L2 types therefore choose
2, if I is large. For the same reason L3 types opt for 1 as the minimizer. The
choices of L4 and higher-level types are less straightforward, as they depend
on the order of the frequencies of L1, L2, and L3. However, numerical com-
putation shows that if 0 < τ < τ¯ , then the lowest number, 1, has the lowest
frequency according to the beliefs of L3 and all higher types, which therefore
also pick 1, if I is not too small.
For τ > τ¯ the PCH-prediction is near and for τ → ∞ converges to the
equilibrium E which equals the uniform distribution for an infinite number
of players. In the range τ ∈ [0, τ¯ ], the PCH-predictions for increasing τ
describe a loop as depicted in Figure 1.8 The loop starts at E, dives into the
triangular section of the simplex where p1 < p2 < p3, takes a turn at around
τ = 0.8 and heads back towards E until it intersects itself at τ = τ¯ . The
pfPCH point-prediction is (p1, p2, p3) ≈ (0.266, 0.325, 0.409).
2.5 Level-k-predictions for the MG
Level-k models have several parameters, viz. the frequencies of the various
types of players. These frequencies have to be estimated from the data
or transferred from estimations in similar games, so unlike Nash equilib-
rium or the pfPCH model, an unconstrained level-k model does not give a
point-prediction for the MG. For predictions we therefore take the generous
approach to allow for all point-predictions possibly arising from the “typi-
cal” estimates outlined in section 1.2 above: The population predominantly
consists of l1 and l2, complemented by smaller fractions of l3, l4, d1, and
equilibrium types. We call the level-k model with these characteristics the
8Technically, this loop is not smooth near E if I is finite, since for every given I there
exists a threshold value of τ below which the L2 type picks 3 instead of 2. But for large I
this threshold value and the resulting discontinuity in the loop are so small that the latter
is not visible in Figure 1.
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standard level-k model or SLK model.
In the MG, the SLK model’s types l0, l1, and l2 are behaviorally indistin-
guishable from the PCH model’s corresponding types L0, L1, and L2. These
types choose uniformly, 3, and 2, respectively. Note, however, that contrary
to the PCH model higher types in the SLK model, by best responding to
level-(k − 1), never choose number 1 but switch between choosing 3 and 2
only. The dominance type d1 behaves like l1 and chooses 3, since there are
no dominated strategies. Finally, the equilibrium type of the SLK model
behaves like the l0 type, since the symmetric equilibrium has an approxi-
mately uniform distribution of number choices. An important constraint in
the SLK model is that, as l1 and l2 are predominant, any other type’s fre-
quency is restricted to be at most 1/3. For the MG this means that at least
2/3 of the population chooses 3 or 2 (types l1 to l4 and d1) and at most 1/3
chooses uniformly (equilibrium type). This translates into the “prediction
set” {(p1, p2, p3) : p1 ≤ min(p2, p3, 1/9)} for the SLK model. This prediction
set is depicted by the shaded area in Figure 1. Note that at most about 11%
of all choices fall on the low amount 1, since this amount is only picked by
1/3 of the equilibrium type, whose frequency is itself constrained to be less
than 1/3.
Apart from their different number of parameters, the major distinction
between the PCH model and the SLK model is that in the SLK model players
expect all other players to be of a single type and therefore to choose the
same strategy, while in the PCH model players of type L2 or higher expect
others to be of different types and to choose potentially different strategies.
In other words, players recognize heterogeneity in the population under PCH,
but not under SLK.
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Figure 1: Nash- (E), SLK- (shaded area), and PCH-predictions (loop) in the
simplex
3 Experiments
3.1 Basic setup and hypotheses
Since the predicted choice frequencies of the pfPCH model are not too far
from the Nash equilibrium E, rejecting the Nash hypothesis with an adequate
statistical power requires a large number of experimental subjects. We there-
fore conducted two large-scale online experiments. A total of 1360 subjects
were recruited from first-year undergraduates at the Vienna University of
Economics and Business. These subjects were unlikely to have been exposed
to game theory, as this is only taught later on.
To provide appropriate, yet feasible incentives, we decided to use sub-
stantial amounts of money as prizes. The basic setup of the game required
participants in the experiment to choose between the three amounts: e100,
e150, and e200. All experiments presented in the following use variations
of this basic game.
Based on the Nash equilibrium of this game for a sufficiently large subject
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pool and on the prediction set of the SLK model, we can state the following
two null-hypotheses:
(H0a) Choice frequencies are uniformly distributed (p1 = p2 = p3).
(H0b) Choice frequencies belong to the SLK model’s prediction set {(p1, p2, p3) :
p1 ≤ min(p2, p3, 1/9)}.
Opposed to these two benchmarks, the predictions derived from the PCH
model give rise to three increasingly sharp hypotheses:
(H1) The choice frequencies p are ordered p1 < p2 < p3.
(H2) The choice frequencies p can be derived from a PCH model for some
Poisson parameter τ .
(H3) The choice frequencies p can be derived from the pfPCH model, i.e. from
the PCH model with Poisson parameter τ = 1.5.
For hypotheses testing and reporting of significant results we apply a 5%
level of significance.
3.2 Experiment 1
When implementing a game for the first time, appropriate incentives are a
main concern. Experimental studies frequently investigate whether behavior
is sensitive to changes in incentives. This question becomes even more cen-
tral in the domain of cognitive models, where incentives might crucially affect
subjects’ cognitive effort. To address this issue appropriately, our first exper-
iment varies the stakes of the game in a between-subjects design. We denote
the basic setup of Experiment 1 described above as the low-stakes treatment
of Experiment 1. In addition, we introduced a high-stakes treatment where
the amounts to choose from were quadrupled to e400, e600 and e800. If
choice distributions are equal across both treatments, the basic findings of
our experiment are not the result of a specific level of incentives.
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3.2.1 Procedure
To conduct the online experiment we chose to use the free software LimeSur-
vey. A cohort of 3824 first-year undergraduate students from the Vienna
University of Economics and Business were invited by e-mail. The e-mail
asked students to participate in an online experiment that could earn them
a substantial amount of money while requiring only a few minutes of their
time. To reduce the transaction costs of participating as much as possible,
the invitation e-mail contained a link to the university web page hosting the
experiment. Each invited student was randomly assigned to one of the two
treatments and received a unique seven-digit identification number to ensure
that he or she could participate only once. Additionally, the e-mail invitation
told subjects how many fellow students had been invited to the experiment
as well, which helped them to assess the strategic situation and create homo-
geneous expectations about the possible pool of participants. 1905 students
were invited to the low stakes treatment, of which 312 (154 females and 158
males) actually took part. For the high stakes treatment, 1919 students were
invited of which 305 (164 females and 141 males) actually participated.9 The
experiment was open for participation for four days.
On the experiment website subjects were instructed that they will have to
choose one of three options that correspond to three different payoff levels.10
They were told that the ‘winning number’ is the one that is chosen least
often among all participants in the treatment. After their choice among
the three amounts of money, subjects had to state their gender and age
before submitting their choice and completing the experiment. The winning
number was announced in an e-mail after the experiment was closed and all
participants were invited for the public draw of the winner.
9After clicking the link to the web page in the invitation e-mail virtually no-one dropped
out of the experiment.
10For instructions and screen shots, see the Appendix.
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3.3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 replicates the low stakes treatment of Experiment 1, but here
the three amounts to choose from were permuted to avoid possible framing
by the increasing order in which the amounts were presented in Experiment
1.11 As in Experiment 1, a (fresh) cohort of first-year undergraduate students
was approached by e-mail invitations. 3680 e-mails were sent, resulting in a
total number of 743 participants (404 females and 339 males).12 All other
procedural details were the same as in the previous experiment.
3.4 Results
As the predictions for the distribution of choices across the three options are
independent of the stake size, we denote the three amounts – irrespective of
the treatment – Small (corresponding to e100 or e400), Medium (e150 or
e600) and Large (e200 or e800). Table 1 presents absolute (n) and relative
(f) choice frequencies for the three amounts in each treatment.
Table 1: Summary of results
Experiment Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Treatment Low stakes High stakes Low stakes Pooled
Amount n f n f n f n f
Small 64 0.21 69 0.23 183 0.25 316 0.23
Medium 108 0.35 103 0.34 260 0.35 471 0.35
Large 140 0.45 133 0.44 300 0.40 573 0.42
Total 312 1 305 1 743 1 1360 1
11Actually, Experiment 2 consisted of six rounds of the minimizer game. The intention
of this was to enable the analysis of potential learning effects, the results of which will be
reported elsewhere. Here we focus on one-shot games and therefore consider exclusively
data from the first round of Experiment 2.
12The slightly higher response rate to the invitations might be due to increased adver-
tising efforts for experiments at the university.
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Table 1 suggests that the distribution of choices across the three possible
amounts is very similar across treatments and experiments. The last two
columns therefore show absolute and relative frequencies of choices when
pooling all treatments. The minimizer is the small amount, while the most
frequently chosen number is the large amount.
Table 2 presents the pooled choice frequencies vis-a-vis the Nash-prediction
(Nash), the closest of all SLK-predictions (cSLK)13, and the parameter-free
PCH-prediction (pfPCH). These point-predictions are also depicted in Fig-
ure 2. The overall choice distribution is significantly different from uniform
(χ2-Test, p < .0001), rejecting the Nash-prediction (hypothesis H0a). It is
also significantly different from the closest of all SLK-predictions (hypothesis
H0b, p < .0001). Moreover, the observed ranking p1 < p2 < p3 is highly sig-
nificant in all pairwise comparisons (one sample test of proportions, p < .0001
for each one). Hence we cannot reject hypothesis H1.14
Table 2: Model predictions vs. choice frequencies
Nash cSLK pfPCH actual choice
Small 0.33 0.11 0.27 0.23
Medium 0.33 0.40 0.33 0.35
Large 0.33 0.49 0.41 0.42
Examining the PCH-loop closer reveals that τ -values ranging from τ =
1.26 to τ = 1.46 predict choice frequencies which are statistically indistin-
guishable on a 5% margin from the sample distribution based on our pooled
data. Figure 3 illustrates this interval of τ -values as the corresponding loop
13This is the maximum-likelihood point-prediction within the prediction set of the SLK
model, which is approximately (0.11, 0.40, 0.49).
14The background characteristics of participants allows to look into potential gender
differences with respect to thinking steps. Tests on the equality of distributions across
female and male participants, as well as across stakes for both females and males, do not
reveal any significant differences.
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Figure 2: Model predictions and experimental distribution (diamond) in the
simplex.
segment of choice frequencies. Hence we cannot reject hypothesis H2. Ac-
cording to a maximum likelihood estimator, the best fitting value for τ under
the assumption that the PCH model applies is τ = 1.37 (with a corresponding
p-value of 0.180).
The interval of τ -values yielding PCH-predictions which are not signifi-
cantly different from the data comes close to, but does not include the value
τ = 1.5 we used for our pfPCH model. Therefore, formally we have to reject
hypothesis H3. This is not surprising, since our test is high-powered and
the pfPCH model is unlikely to capture subjects’ beliefs and choices exactly.
However, the pfPCH-prediction is remarkably close to the data, especially
when compared with the rival models. From Figure 2 this seems obvious.
To quantify the accuracy of the three primary models’ predictions we show
in Table 3 the normalized distance15 between predictions and experimental
choice frequencies as well as the p-values of the χ2-tests associated to the
15This is the Euclidean distance divided by 0.942, the maximum possible distance of a
point in the 3-simplex from the choice frequencies.
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Figure 3: PCH-predictions with 1.26 < τ < 1.46 are not significantly different
from the pooled data.
three models given the data.
Table 3: Prediction accuracy
Nash cSLK pfPCH
norm. distance 0.143 0.158 0.044
p-value 10−16 10−44 0.02
The pfPCH-prediction clearly stands out compared to the Nash- and
the cSLK-prediction. The runner-up, Nash equilibrium, has a normalized
distance from the data which is larger by a factor of 3.25, and the probability
of getting the experimental or more extreme data is larger by a factor of
2× 1014 for pfPCH than for Nash.
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4 Other predictions
4.1 Alternative level-0 behavior
The usual assumption on level-0 behavior in the SLK- and the PCH model is
that these players randomize uniformly over the set of pure strategies. This
assumption can be applied to any finite game and is a natural choice for
a general prediction model. There are, however, other suggestions as well.
It might be argued that in the MG the nonstrategic approach would be to
choose the highest amount. Indeed, among the five level-0 features discussed
by Wright and Leyton-Brown (2014a), only maxmax payoff and minimax
regret are selective in the MG, and both point to the large amount as the
nonstrategic choice.
If we employ this alternative, the SLK model’s prediction-set does not
change. However, the pfPCH-prediction does. The large amount is now
chosen by L0 and L3 types, the medium amount is chosen by L1, while
L2, L4 and all higher types choose the small amount. This results in an
overall choice distribution which is very close to uniform, viz. the point-
prediction (0.32, 0.33, 0.35). This prediction has a normalized distance from
the experimental choice distribution of 0.119 and can easily be rejected (p <
10−11).
4.2 Asymmetric Nash equilibria
Thinking-steps models allow for heterogenous types, while symmetric Nash
equilibrium does not. One might therefore want to include asymmetric equi-
libria into the Nash model. While we do not think that asymmetric Nash
equilibria are meaningful as possible predictions of initial behavior in one-shot
symmetric games with many players, we include them here for completeness.
The pure asymmetric Nash equilibrium profiles of the MG described in
section 2.3 have the common structure that two amounts are chosen the same
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number of times and the third amount is chosen more often. These equilib-
ria lead to choice distributions which form three rays in the simplex, each
connecting the center E with one of the vertices. Among the points in this
Nash-prediction-set the maximum likelihood prediction is (0.29, 0.29, 0.43)
with normalized distance of 0.086, which can also be rejected (p < 10−6).
In the behavioral and psychological game theory literature there are other
equilibrium concepts as well. While these do not explicitly try to capture ini-
tial choices, we include two of them in the following sections just to demon-
strate that none of them can even substantially improve upon the Nash-
prediction for the MG.
4.3 Quantal response equilibrium
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) was introduced by McKelvey and Pal-
frey (1995). In a QRE, players adopt noisy best responses to each other’s
choices. A common specification is logit equilibrium (LQRE), where players’
choices are based on the logistic quantal response function with parameter
λ. A symmetric LQRE p requires that pk =
eλu(k,p)∑3
j=1 e
λu(j,p) , where u(k, p) is
the expected payoff of a player choosing amount ek while all others play the
mixture p.
For the MG, the same argument as for Nash equilibrium (see footnote
7) shows that as the number of players goes to infinity, symmetric LQREs
converge to the uniform distribution E in the simplex for any value of λ.
Hence for a large number of players the LQRE-prediction approximately
coincides with NE and can therefore be rejected as well.
4.4 Impulse balance equilibrium
In a symmetric (generalized) impulse balance equilibrium (IBE), each player
selects each pure strategy with a probability proportional to its expected
impulse, the impulse of a pure strategy given an opponents’ pure strategy
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profile being the difference between this strategy’s payoff and the lowest
payoff among all pure strategies (Chmura et al., 2014). In the MG the least
payoff is zero for any opponents’ pure strategy profile and the impulse of
a strategy is simply its payoff. In a mixed symmetric IBE p the frequency
pk is therefore its relative payoff pk =
u(k,p)∑3
j=1 u(j,p)
. As for LQRE above, p
approximates the uniform distribution E as the number of players grows
large. The IBE-prediction can therefore be rejected.
5 Conclusion
We discussed the question why the PCH model (based on self-regarding pref-
erences) seems to predict well in some games and fails in others. Based
on conjectures about possible biases due to social preferences, complexity-
induced infeasibility of maximizing behavior, and maximin-principle interfer-
ence, we constructed a multi-player game, the minimizer game, that avoids
these obstacles. We then formulated three increasingly sharp hypotheses
from the PCH approach, where the last one corresponds to a context- and
parameter-free prediction. We tested these hypotheses in two large-scale In-
ternet experiments. Stake size did not appear to influence the distribution
of thinking steps. Predictions derived from Nash equilibrium and the SLK
model are clearly rejected by the data from our experiments, and also quantal
response equilibrium and impulse balance equilibrium did not predict exper-
imental choices well. We could not reject the hypothesis that the data result
from some PCH model. While the hypothesis that the pfPCH model is the
true model can be rejected, it nevertheless predicts remarkably well.
We did not believe that τ = 1.5 is the best overall choice for the PCH
model; we just used this suggestion to avoid any appearance of post hoc model
fitting. But we think that our results show that when a game is “pure” and
“simple”, i.e. stripped of all complications introduced by social preferences,
algebraic complexities and risk issues, then the thinking steps approach to
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predicting behavior is useful. Furthermore, under these circumstances the
pfPCH model might be a better predictor than the SLK model. The reason
for this seems to be that the latter ignores subjects’ taking into account that
the behavior of others might be heterogenous. We therefore propose the
pfPCH model as a useful context- and parameter-free alternative to Nash
equilibrium in predicting initial choices in simple games.
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A Appendix: Instructions
These instructions have been translated from German. Original instructions
are available from the authors upon request.
A.1 Experiment 1: Instructions and choice screen
Screen 1: Instructions
Experiment 1 
 
Screen 1: Instructions 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this online experiment! 
 
Instructions 
 
On the following page, you will find three amounts of money to choose from. Please select one of the 
three amounts! 
 
The amount that is selected least often by all participants is the winning amount. 
 
Of all participants who selected this winning amount, one will be randomly drawn as the winner. This 
participant will be paid out the winning amount. 
 
Note: 
To keep the chances of being drawn the winner, you have to select the amount that you believe will 
be selected least often in total. 
 
     
 
 
 
Screen 2: Choice in low (high) stakes treatments 
 
 
Please choose one of the three amounts: 
 
100 € (400 €) 
150 € (600 €) 
 200 € (800 €) 
 
Help: Here are the rules again: The amount that is chosen least often by all participants is the 
winning amount. Of all participants who have selected this winning amount, one will be randomly 
drawn as the winner. She/he receives this winning amount as payoff. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Proceed >> 
 Proceed >> 
Scre n 2: hoice in low (high) st kes treatment
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Experiment 1 
 
Screen 1: Instructions 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this online-experiment! 
 
Instructions 
 
On the following page, you will find three amounts of money to choose from. Please select one of the 
three amounts! 
 
The amount that is selected least often by all participants is the winning amount. 
 
Of all participants who selected this winning amount, one will be randomly drawn as the winner. This 
participant will be paid out the winning amount. 
 
Note: 
To keep the chances of being drawn the winner, you have to select the amount that you believe will 
be selected least often in total. 
 
     
 
 
 
Screen 2: Choice in low (high) stakes treatments 
 
 
Please choose one of the three amounts: 
 
 100 € (400 €) 
 150 € (600 €) 
 200 € (800 €) 
 
Help: Here are the rules again: The amount that is chosen least often by all participants is the 
winning amount. Of all participants who have selected this winning amount, one will be randomly 
drawn as the winner. She/he receives this winning amount as payoff. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Proceed >> 
 Proceed >> 
A.2 Experiment 2: Instructions and choice screen
Screen 1: Instructions
Experiment 3 
 
 
Screen 1: Instructions 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this online experiment! 
 
Instructions 
 
1. This online experiment consists of 6 rounds. In each of the following 6 rounds, you must select 
one of 3 amounts of money. 
2. When all participants have completed the experiment, one of the 6 rounds is randomly drawn. 
This round is called decision round. 
3. The amount of money that is in the decision round selected least often by all participants is the 
winning amount. 
4. Of all participants who have chosen the winning amount in the decision round, one participant 
is randomly drawn. She/he is notified by mail and receives the winning amount in cash. 
 Note: Each round can be the decision round. To keep the chances of being drawn the winner, you 
have to select the amount that you believe will be selected least often in this round. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Screen 2: Choice 
 
 
 Round 1: 
 Please choose one of the three amounts: 
 
 
   100 €   200 €   150 € 
 
 
 Help: This is round 1. If this round is drawn as the decision round, the amount that is chosen least 
often by all participants in this round is the winning amount. Of all participants who have chosen 
the winning amount in this round, one will be randomly drawn as the winner. She/he receives the 
winning amount in cash. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Proceed >> 
 Proceed >> 
S e 2: Choice in round 1
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Experiment 3 
 
 
Screen 1: Instructions 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this online experiment! 
 
Instructions 
 
1. This online experiment consists of 6 rounds. In each of the following 6 rounds, you must select 
one of 3 amounts of money. 
2. When all participants have completed the experiment, one of the 6 rounds is randomly drawn. 
This round is called decision round. 
3. The amount of money that is in the decision round selected least often by all participants is the 
winning amount. 
4. Of all participants who have chosen the winning amount in the decision round, one participant 
is randomly drawn. She/he is notified by mail and receives the winning amount in cash. 
 Note: Each round can be the decision round. To keep the chances of being drawn the winner, you 
have to select the amount that you believe will be selected least often in this round. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Screen 2: Choice 
 
 
 Round 1: 
 Please choose one of the three amounts: 
 
 
   100 €   200 €   150 € 
 
 
 Help: This is round 1. If this round is drawn as the decision round, the amount that is chosen least 
often by all participants in this round is the winning amount. Of all participants who have chosen 
the winning amount in this round, one will be randomly drawn as the winner. She/he receives the 
winning amount in cash. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Proceed >> 
 Proceed >> 
A.3 Both experiments: final screens
Screen: Gender
 
 
 
 
 
All experiments 
 
Screen: Gender 
 
 
Please state your gender: 
 
 Female 
 Male 
 
  
 
 
Screen 4: Final submission  
 
 
To finally submit your choice(s), please click on the submit button. 
 
  
 
 
Screen 5: Confirmation 
 
 
Thank you for participating! 
 
To confirm that we received your decision, you will obtain an e-mail shortly. In case you are the lucky 
winner, you will be notified by e-mail as well. 
 
 
 
 Proceed >> 
 Submit >> 
Screen: Submission
Screen: Confirmation
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All experiments 
 
Screen: Gender 
 
 
Please state your gender: 
 
 Female 
 Male 
 
  
 
 
Screen 4: Final submission  
 
 
To finally submit your choice(s), please click on the submit button. 
 
  
 
 
Screen 5: Confirmation 
 
 
Thank you for participating! 
 
To confirm that we received your decision, you will obtain an e-mail shortly. In case you are the lucky 
winner, you will be notified by e-mail as well. 
 
 
 
 Proceed >> 
 Submit >> 
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